Good piece and something I’ll look into a bit more.
I’ve visited the blockhaus at Eperleques and the RAF sure put some big cracks in it!
I think the vaccine team did a stellar job and it actually felt like a war time level of urgency.
I just wish we’d apply same mentality to say the SMR programme. RR should be building them already!
As an observation, the quicker you do something, the cheaper it generally is. Finding consensus, scope changes and everyone having a veto are the killers of projects. You don’t have those ‘luxuries’ in war time.
Good Law project for me was just a political attack vessel. The fact they’ve stopped now says it all.
Interesting piece, thanks.It brought back a few memories for me. I read Paul Brickhill’s book in the early 1960’s when I was around 8 or 9, and was inspired by Leonard Cheshire. We lived down the road from a Cheshire Home in Hong Kong at the time, and I got to meet him and have a photo taken with him. I found him a bit baffling - I was too young, and he didn’t know how to talk to young kids, but I’m glad I have the experience and the photo.
For another angle on Leonard Cheshire can I recommend "Mosquitto Men" by David Price, about pathfinder 627 squadron. While not the most polished of books it does a good job covering pathfinding throughout the war and how the techniques evolved, using interviews and written material from the men themselves.
Gibson was posted after the dams raid, sent on a publicity tour of the US and on his return to the uk killed in action Sept ‘44. Gibson’s immediate replacement, George Holden, was killed almost immediately (Sept 43) and Harold Martin took over temporarily before Cheshire was appointed in November 1943. Theres some suggestion that Gibson was jealous of Cheshire’s success at that contributed to his hubris in flying ad hoc operations for which he was not trained.
Though Gibson, who led the Dams raid itself, was quite the contrast to Cheshire as a character and commander. Bumptious was the term used to describe him. Not universally popular.
Whilst I feel a little bit nervous commenting on the stats of casualty rates on Bomber Command as you'll no more about statistics than I ever will, I feel the 5% casualty rate is a bit misleading, as whilst its correct overall, the more experienced you were the less likely you were to be killed (there were disproportionate numbers of crews shot down on their first few missions and the numbers also include training mission deaths, which again would be proportionately less experienced crews - eg disorientated by night flying) so Cheshire's actual chance of survival would be higher, as it wouldn't be a flat 5% across missions (though it was still extremely low and I'm not taking anything away from his bravery).
That's very fair, and I wouldn't really disagree .. though I think some of the missions (like the Munich one, and the attacks on the V2 blockhouses) were probably more dangerous than average, so it probably balances out a little bit. But yes, 5% may not be the correct number, but even say 2-3% is plenty high enough!
Crews reckoned there was a higher risk in say the first 5 or so sorties before operational expertise was developed, then a plateau up to the near tour end when cumulative effect of operational fatigue and end of tour nerves built up.
Also markedly different stats by aircraft I believe. Stirlings, which flew lower, had a higher casualty rate. But then they were phased out.
Enjoyed this piece, but not sure it’s as strong a link from the way 617 worked to the success of the Task Force in terms of exceptionalism being unlocked. Maybe, and forgive the pun, it was in both cases a matter of the air cover provided from within the buearacries of the time and getting the right people in place; both periods were times when there was lot of need and pressure to build competence without always following the niceties. Both are still good stories though.
Thanks, and of course it's a matter of taste as to how far you think the analogy goes. Though I think in some cases with the COVID response in general, some people would have preferred us to "follow the niceties" as you put it, whereas sometimes we just had to go with our best guess at the time. (I'm not sure how solid the population-level evidence was for the effectiveness of lateral flow tests when we bought hundreds of millions of them for example, but there was a reasonable belief that it was a sensible thing to do which paid off in the end)
Fascinating piece. Sorry to be dim, but could you explain in simple terms why your graph is that shape - and why doubling your missions reduces your chances by a factor of about 13?
It's not doubling your missions per se, it's that 50 missions have that effect (in a toy model at least - see another comment in this thread), there was also a factor of 13 drop from 100% to 8% in going from no missions to 50. Essentially if you are going to survive n missions, then you have to survive each one, which happens with 0.95 probability. So overall, it's (0.95)^n which decays in that exponential shape. Similar things would be true for the chance of tossing heads in a row, or not landing on double-zero in roulette for example.
Good piece and something I’ll look into a bit more.
I’ve visited the blockhaus at Eperleques and the RAF sure put some big cracks in it!
I think the vaccine team did a stellar job and it actually felt like a war time level of urgency.
I just wish we’d apply same mentality to say the SMR programme. RR should be building them already!
As an observation, the quicker you do something, the cheaper it generally is. Finding consensus, scope changes and everyone having a veto are the killers of projects. You don’t have those ‘luxuries’ in war time.
Good Law project for me was just a political attack vessel. The fact they’ve stopped now says it all.
It's a tough one I think, you do want to consult people and build consensus if you can, but sometimes you aren't going to get everyone to agree ..
Amazingly the Good Law Project still have their misguided attempt to smear Kate Bingham as not fit fir the job up on their website. https://goodlawproject.org/update/jobs-for-mates-jr/
Gosh, that's quite the thing. I'm a big fan of her tea towel, it's a pity you can't buy them on Amazon https://x.com/Jesse_Norman/status/1578664883935010816
Interesting piece, thanks.It brought back a few memories for me. I read Paul Brickhill’s book in the early 1960’s when I was around 8 or 9, and was inspired by Leonard Cheshire. We lived down the road from a Cheshire Home in Hong Kong at the time, and I got to meet him and have a photo taken with him. I found him a bit baffling - I was too young, and he didn’t know how to talk to young kids, but I’m glad I have the experience and the photo.
Still, that's a very cool story to be able to tell now!
For another angle on Leonard Cheshire can I recommend "Mosquitto Men" by David Price, about pathfinder 627 squadron. While not the most polished of books it does a good job covering pathfinding throughout the war and how the techniques evolved, using interviews and written material from the men themselves.
Interesting, thanks!
Did Cheshire take over 617 after Gibson was killed? Or had Gibson transferred to another unit after the dams raid?
According to Wikipedia, Gibson stepped back after the dams raid, partly to do a publicity tour, and there were a couple of people in between (Holden and Martin) before Cheshire took over https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._617_Squadron_RAF#1943%E2%80%931955
Gibson was posted after the dams raid, sent on a publicity tour of the US and on his return to the uk killed in action Sept ‘44. Gibson’s immediate replacement, George Holden, was killed almost immediately (Sept 43) and Harold Martin took over temporarily before Cheshire was appointed in November 1943. Theres some suggestion that Gibson was jealous of Cheshire’s success at that contributed to his hubris in flying ad hoc operations for which he was not trained.
Though Gibson, who led the Dams raid itself, was quite the contrast to Cheshire as a character and commander. Bumptious was the term used to describe him. Not universally popular.
He's probably been Cancelled already because of the whole dog/slur thing, but interesting thanks
Whilst I feel a little bit nervous commenting on the stats of casualty rates on Bomber Command as you'll no more about statistics than I ever will, I feel the 5% casualty rate is a bit misleading, as whilst its correct overall, the more experienced you were the less likely you were to be killed (there were disproportionate numbers of crews shot down on their first few missions and the numbers also include training mission deaths, which again would be proportionately less experienced crews - eg disorientated by night flying) so Cheshire's actual chance of survival would be higher, as it wouldn't be a flat 5% across missions (though it was still extremely low and I'm not taking anything away from his bravery).
That's very fair, and I wouldn't really disagree .. though I think some of the missions (like the Munich one, and the attacks on the V2 blockhouses) were probably more dangerous than average, so it probably balances out a little bit. But yes, 5% may not be the correct number, but even say 2-3% is plenty high enough!
Crews reckoned there was a higher risk in say the first 5 or so sorties before operational expertise was developed, then a plateau up to the near tour end when cumulative effect of operational fatigue and end of tour nerves built up.
Also markedly different stats by aircraft I believe. Stirlings, which flew lower, had a higher casualty rate. But then they were phased out.
Enjoyed this piece, but not sure it’s as strong a link from the way 617 worked to the success of the Task Force in terms of exceptionalism being unlocked. Maybe, and forgive the pun, it was in both cases a matter of the air cover provided from within the buearacries of the time and getting the right people in place; both periods were times when there was lot of need and pressure to build competence without always following the niceties. Both are still good stories though.
Thanks, and of course it's a matter of taste as to how far you think the analogy goes. Though I think in some cases with the COVID response in general, some people would have preferred us to "follow the niceties" as you put it, whereas sometimes we just had to go with our best guess at the time. (I'm not sure how solid the population-level evidence was for the effectiveness of lateral flow tests when we bought hundreds of millions of them for example, but there was a reasonable belief that it was a sensible thing to do which paid off in the end)
Fascinating piece. Sorry to be dim, but could you explain in simple terms why your graph is that shape - and why doubling your missions reduces your chances by a factor of about 13?
It's not doubling your missions per se, it's that 50 missions have that effect (in a toy model at least - see another comment in this thread), there was also a factor of 13 drop from 100% to 8% in going from no missions to 50. Essentially if you are going to survive n missions, then you have to survive each one, which happens with 0.95 probability. So overall, it's (0.95)^n which decays in that exponential shape. Similar things would be true for the chance of tossing heads in a row, or not landing on double-zero in roulette for example.
Thanks. Of course!
Richard Morris bio of Cheshire is a good read (although probably more of the same...). His life after the war wasn't without merit either.